The Nile Basin and Access to the Sea: “The Grand Strategy on the Two Waters of Ethiopia:”
Please read and don’t mind the length.

I share with you the following cursory [draft] review of what the Prosperity Party considers to be its ultimate strategy towards access to the sea.

The Institute of Foreign Affairs, a foreign policy think tank based in Addis Ababa, in collaboration with several senior ambassadors, diplomates, and Addis Ababa University, have organized Prime Minister Abiy’s far reaching strategies towards the two waters of the Nile River and the Red Sea. A booklet, which consists of about 53 pages with footnotes in some areas, is thus far provided to the highest echelon of the ruling Prosperity Party; the document exists only in Amharic and has yet to be translated into English for a wider circulation. This document violets international law and, in particular, expresses unprecedented claims on neighboring countries.

The title of the booklet is. When translated into English “The Grand Strategy of the Two Waters.” The two waters referenced here are the Nile and the Red Sea. The focus of the analysis is the history, religion, and politics surrounding these two different waters and the religious, historical and political views of the Ethiopian state towards the waters.

The report at the outset claims that both waters pose security challenges to Ethiopia. It also maintains that these waters are sources for diplomatic row, and proxy wars with those that share the same water bodies. Second, it asserts that the country’s future development is believed to be intertwined with those water bodies. History shows that at times when Ethiopia was in a better position to control or to have access to those water bodies, there were better chances of prosperity, says the report. To substantiate this point, the report goes back to pre-Christianity era when Ethiopia controlled both waters. In this respect, a wild and unsubstantiated religious argument is advanced that Ethiopia was blessed by its “creator” to have been with both the Nile and the Red Sea. With this argument, it appears as if religious justification for achieving prosperity would be central to Ethiopia’s access to the Sea or controlling the flow of the water of the Nile.

To control the Nile or recapture access to the sea, a wild and grand strategy is developed, which would require  the mobilization of all national resources and the coordination of different government agencies to achieve the Grand Strategy toward the Two Water!

Ethiopia says, for example “the Nile basin and the access to the sea is a national security matter. These threats are both past and present. There is, therefore, a need to have a comprehensive strategy to withstand threats from outside. There is a need to use all national powers to eliminate these threats. To that end, three priority areas that are complimentary strategies are necessary to outline: Military strength, economic browse, and diplomatic efforts.

History of the Nile: By 1959, Egypt was utilizing the river to the tune of 55.5 billion cubic meters and 14 cubic meters for Sudan’s use. Moreover, the chapter centers on international politics and the need for Arab countries to produce food. Since 2008, when the Middle East faced food shortages, the politics of the Nile River became all the more important.”

It is also a fact, says the report, that members of the Arab League also stand with Egypt on the Nile debate. In that regard, the report details how Ethiopia feels about her struggle to develop the Renaissance Dam and how ready it is to face off with Egypt.
Ethiopia is a key player in the affairs of both waters (the Nile river and the red sea littoral).

In order for Ethiopia to advance more than what it had thus far achieved, it needs to regain its historical access to the Red Sea which in the past enabled her to be a powerful county. Having a clear and effective policy towards these two waters is an existential national issue. There will be challenges diplomatically as we implement our strategies toward the two waters, but we have to persevere in order to realize our national objectives.

The fourth chapter of the booklet is one of the most consequential parts of the booklet in that it justifies the PP’s search for access to the sea on the basis of religion and ancient albeit unsubstantiated history. It writes the following (my translation for the Amharic version):
Under a subheading of the “the Aksum and the Zagwe era,” the report relies on G.W.B Huntington’s 1980 book “The Periplus of the Eritrean Sea,” where trade between Muslim Sultanates and kings of Aksum traded. Finally, the report comes to the 1523 conflicts and completely ignores the Ahmed AlGaza war and dismisses it as a civil war within Ethiopia.

By relying and quoting the accounts of Alf Yaqub (Kitan Al0-Buldan), it goes to say that in the 9th and up to the 12th century of the Zagwe dynasty, the main port of access for Abyssinia was Zylac. It also argues that Zylac was under Abyssinian rule.

The report carefully threads the history of Ethiopia’s search for a port between 1855 and 1991. Here a discussion of history and scenarios analysis that could be detrimental to Eritrea is advanced.

The report argues that unless Ethiopia ignores international and regional laws, including its neighbors’ territorial integrity and sovereignty, it will not succeed to own its own ports or access to the sea Ethiopia seeks, the report argues, unhindered access to the sea for national security and economic growth.

On Eritrea, the Report is unsettling. It writes that “the era of Emperor Menelik and the agreements signed with Italy over Eritrea. Because these agreements over Eritrea were signed under duress, they could be challenged in a court of law. It was not signed voluntarily.” This analysis sets the tone of future claims over Assab and Massawa  which Addis Ababa claims to have lost in the hands of a rough leader – Meles Zenawi.

Building a strong navy is part of the country’s top strategy. Even without a port, the navy to secure Ethiopia commercial ships in the high seas is a fundamental national security issue.
Djibouti has so far served Ethiopia well, but the cost for financing tariffs is a heavy burden on growth. Also, Djibouti is far from the center of production in Ethiopia.

At the closing chapter, the following strategies are advanced:

Objective 5: Create a navy and even both for military and for commercial purposes. Also, build a powerful national defense army. This helps secure national security.
Also these options are considered
Option 1- Ethiopia is tied to Eritrea, Djibouti therefore look at these two as option one. Eritrea is much closer to Ethiopia culturally and historically. Effort must be made to revive and continue good relations with Eritrea. Option 2 – Djibouti so far serves as the main port for Ethiopia. However, there is a concern over transition and what could happen between Issa Somali and Afar. Also the presence of major power is a double concern.
Option 3 – Somaliland/Somalia is precarious because of controversy over recognition. Also, Zayla and Berber are less developed; they will not help in the immediate future, but could benefit in the long run. The possibility of these three coastal countries becoming antagonistic to Ethiopia is not unthinkable. Ethiopia should prepare for this eventuality.

And that is why Ethiopia has advanced these two dangers scenarios to follow as a way to implement the MOU it signed with Somalia’s Somaliland region:
Strategy 1: to take ports in Somalia by force as Israel did to the Golan Heights after the 1967 six-day war.
Strategy 2: to use a similar invasion Russia did to Ukraine where Ethiopia would occupy strip land as an access and strategic posts along the coast and never relinquish.

In both cases, the global community will get tired of speaking against Ethiopia, the report stipulates.

By Faisal Roble